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I. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
A. Burden of Proof as to Safety Program Adequacy
Employer1 liability under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 (OSHA or the Act)2 for violations caused by employee' misconduct
has been the subject of substantial litigation.4 Decisions by OSHA
administrative tribunals5 and by the federal circuit courts have yielded
diverse and often contradictory results as to both procedural and
substantive matters.8 The resulting confusion does little to bolster
employer confidence in OSHA enforcement and has created serious
problems in defending against alleged health and safety violations.7 The
Fourth Circuit recently clarified the existing confusion with a ruling
favoring employers.
In Ocean Electric Corp. v. Secretary of Labor,8 following the
accidental electrocution of a company employee, an OSHA compliance
officer 9 cited Ocean Electric for a violation of the safety standard
requiring that "extraordinary caution" be used in the handling of
electrical equipment. 10 Specifically, the inspector charged Ocean with
failing to provide a protective barrier between company employees and an
See Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative Law, 37 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 389, 391
n.4 (1980)[hereinafter cited as Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative Law].
2 See id. at 389 n.1.
See id. at 392 n.13.
4 See, e.g., Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir. 1976); Home Plumbing &
Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsea), 511 F.2d
1139 (9th Cir. 1975); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir.
1973); Howard P. Foley Co., [1977-78] Occ. SAp. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 21,862, at 26,339
(1977); Briscoe/Arrace/Conduit, [1977-78] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 21,631, at
25,982 (1977); Robert W. Winzinger, Inc., [1976-77] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
20,929, at 25,133 (1976); Weatherhead Co., [1976-77] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
20,784, at 24,921 (1976); Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co., [1974-75] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) 19,203, at 22,956 (1975); Mississippi Valley Erection Co., [1973-74] Occ. SAP.
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 17,098, at 21,748 (1973). See generally M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPA-
TIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW §§ 90, 100 (1978) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSTEIN]; Note,
OSHA: Employer Liability for Employee Violations, 1977 DuKE L.J. 614 [hereinafter cited
as Employer Liability].
See Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative Law, supra note 1, at 393 n.19 & 394
n.21.
' See notes 49-52 infra.
See generally Andrews & Cross, Defending an Employer Against an Alleged Viola-
tion of the General Duty Clause, 9 GONz. L. REV. 399 (1974); Employer Liabiltiy, supra
note 4, at 622 n.44.
594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979).
A "Compliance Safety and Health Officer" is a person authorized by the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration, U.S. Department of Labor, to conduct OSHA inspec-
tions. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.21(d) (1979).
20 29 C.F.R. § 1926.957(a) (1979). Section 1926.957 (a)(3) requires the use of extraordi-
nary caution in handling bus bars, tower steel materials, and equipment in the vicinity of
energized electrical facilities.
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energized electrical bus bar"' within a switch gear. 12 Although a closed
door in the switch gear housing normally prevented contact with the bus
bar, Ocean's job foreman exposed the bar by inadvertently leaving the
housing door open.' 3 A company employee working under the foreman's
orders accidentally touched the switch gear and was electrocuted.
4
The citation 5 issued by the OSHA compliance officer resulted in the
imposition of a $700 penalty against Ocean." Ocean contested the
citation before an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ),'17  denying
responsibility for an unforeseeable and unpreventable accident caused by
the foreman's error.'" The ALJ rejected Ocean's argument and upheld the
citation on the basis of the common law doctrine of respondeat superior,
which holds a master liable for the wrongful acts of his servants.
On review, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
(Commission)20 affirmed the ALJ's holding2 ' but used different reasoning.
The Commission recognized that Congress did not intend to hold
employers stricly liable for the acts of their superviory employees.2 2
Rather, the Commission stated that liability should not attach where a
company has taken all feasible precautions to assure compliance with
OSHA standards, but an unforeseeable and therefore unpreventable
violation is nevertheless caused by a supervisor.2 The Commission's
decision permitted an employer to establish an affirmative defense by
1 A bus bar is a metal bar designed to carry high voltage electricity. Contrary to good
safety practice, the bus bar involved in the Ocean case was not insulated. Brief for the
Secretary of Labor at 2, Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir.
1979) [hereinafter cited as Brief for the Secretary]. See note 12 infra.
12 A switch gear is an electrical or mechanical device for switching on high voltage elec-
tricity. The door to the switch gear housing was not locked. The Navy was responsible for
leaving the bus bar uninsulated and the housing door unlocked. Brief for Secretary, supra
note 11, at 2 n.2. The Navy had contracted with Ocean Electric to install an additional
switch gear at the Oceana Naval Air Station in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Ocean Elec. Corp.
v. Secretary of Labor, No. 76-1060, slip op. at 4 (4th Cir., Aug. 2, 1977) (unpublished first
opinion, withdrawn on rehearing).
"3 594 F.2d at 398. Ocean's foreman, Watson, opened the housing door in the course of
removing an unenergized ground bus bar from the switch gear. Removal of the ground bus
bar was necessary to facilitate installation of the new switch gear unit beside the existing
one. Id. at 397.
" Id. at 398.
" See Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative Law, supra note 1, at 393 n.16.
1" The original amount of the penalty was $1000, but the penalty was reduced by 10%
for good faith, and 20% because Ocean had no prior OSHA violations. 594 F.2d at 398.
1 See Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative Law, supra note 1, at 393 n.19.
1 Ocean Elec. Corp., [1974-75] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 18,422, at 22,466
(1974) (CCH Summary).
"9 Id.; see text accompanying notes 29-32 infra; note 28 infra (Commission decision
reversed on remand because respondeat superior analysis used).
20 See Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative Law, supra note 1, at 394 n.21.
2 Ocean Elec. Corp., [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 20,167, at 23,992
(1975).
22 Id. at 22,993-94.
23 Id. at 23,993.
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demonstrating that all necessary precautions were taken to prevent the
violation.24 An employer's safety program would be a key element in
establishing that a violation was unforeseeable and unpreventable. The
Commission stated that safety violations committed by supervisors can
be considered unforeseeable if the employer has provided effective safety
training.25 Thus, the Commission found that where an OSHA violation is
caused by employee misconduct, an adequate safety program is a
prerequisite to establishing a defense of unforeseeability2 6 The Review
Commission's decision to sustain the citation turned on a finding that
Ocean had not successfully met the requisite burden of proof in
demonstrating the adequacy of its safety program.
27 
-
On appeal, the Fourth Circuit reversed the finding against Ocean.
2 8
24 The Commission previously allowed defenses similar to the unforeseeability/un-
preventability defense only when a violation was created by non-supervisory personnel. See
text accompanying notes 48-51 infra (discussing unforeseeability/unpreventability defense).
The Commission pointed out that the defense would be more difficult to establish where
supervisory personnel are concerned. The Commission cited National Realty & Constr. Co.
v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973), for the proposition that because supervisory
personnel set an example in the workplace, the employer has a greater duty to insure the
proper conduct of such personnel. Id. at 1267 n.38. Also, the fact that a foreman could feel
free to breach a safety policy is strong evidence of substandard safety policy enforcement.
[1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 20,167, at 23,994 n.2.
25 [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) q 20,167, at 23,994. The view that lack of
an adequate safety program may constructively be used to indicate the foreseeability of a
particular violation is widely accepted. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599
F.2d 453, 459 (1st Cir. 1979); Home Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 568-
69 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir.
1975); National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Employer Liability, supra note 4, at 621. See also notes 43 & 52 infra.
28 [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 20,167, at 23,994.
27 Id. Commissioner Cleary concurred in the Ocean decision but added that the actions
and knowledge of supervisory personnel should be imputed to their employers. Cleary ap-
parently would have allowed the unpreventability defense, however, had the case involved
non-supervisory employees or a foreman not acting in his supervisory capacity. Id. at 23,994
n.5. Commissioner Cleary relied, in part, on the respondeat superior analysis used in Floyd
S. Pike Elec. Contr., Inc., [1974-75] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 19,274, at 23,047
(1975). The Fourth Circuit had previously vacated and remanded Pike because of the re-
spondeat superior analysis used. Floyd S. Pike Elec. Contr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 557 F.2d 1045,
1046 (4th Cir. 1977).
Commissioner Moran dissented in Ocean, voicing two objections which ultimately were
adopted by the Fourth Circuit. Moran objected that the citation and the conduct of the
hearings did not emphasize the adequacy of Ocean's safety program, which ultimately be-
came the basis for the Commission's decision. Additionally, Moran felt that the Secretary
should have carried the burden of proving that Ocean's efforts, including Ocean's safety
program, fell short of the standard of responsibility required to prevent such violations.
Ocean Elec. Corp., [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) T 20,167 at 23,995 (1978)
(Moran, C., dissenting).
25 Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979). The Fourth
Circuit previously filed an opinion affirming the Commission. Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary
of Labor, No. 76-1060 (4th Cir. Aug. 2, 1977) (unpublished first opinion, withdrawn on re-
hearing). Judge Craven, writing for the court, based his decision on agency/respondeat supe-
rior principles. Craven felt that a contrary holding would artifically separate a company
1980]
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The court agreed with the Commission that application of the respondeat
superior theory was improper in OSHA employeer liability cases.2 9 The
Fourth Circuit found that under OSHA case law, a citation is
inappropriate if based on an employee act which is an "isolated incident
of unforeseeable or idiosyncratic behavior."3 0 The Ocean court reasoned
that a contrary holding would go beyond congressional goals in enacting
OSHA, since employers were not intended to be made insurers of
employee safety.3' Thus, the Fourth Circuit agreed with the Review
Commission that holding employers liable for safety violations, regardless
of efforts to comply, would only discourage such efforts.32
The Fourth Circuit disagreed with the Commission, however, on the
issue of who must prove an accident's preventability, holding that the
Secretary of Labor (Secretary) must bear this burden instead of the
employer.33 The court specifically ruled that the Secretary must prove
employer knowledge of an OSHA violation.3 4 This employer knowledge is
the same knowledge which the Act requires to uphold a serious violation
of a safety standard. 5 The court buttressed this holding by citing a
regulation stating generally that the Secretary has the burden of proof in
OSHA proceedings.3 " In addition, the Ocean court cited the D.C. Circuit's
holding in National Realty & Construction Co. v. Occupational Safety &
from its supervisors and render the Act meaningless. Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of La-
bor, No. 76-1060, slip op. at 8, 10 (4th Cir. Aug. 2 1977). The Chief Judge concurred in the
original Ocean decision, although he disagreed with the application of respondeat superior
prinicples. The Chief Judge's concurring opinion expressed the view that Ocean had not
done everything reasonably possible to assure compliance with OSHA standards. Id. at 15-
16. Judge Field dissented, noting the concern voiced in Commissioner Moran's dissent at
the Commission hearing, see note 27 supra, and raised the possibility that the Commission's
procedure violated due process. Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, No. 76-1060, slip
op. at 23. After the original decision, however, the Fourth Circuit held a rehearing before a
reconstituted panel. In reversing the Commission's decision following rehearing, the Fourth
Circuit withdrew the original opinion.
29 594 F.2d at 403. Given that the purpose of OSHA is preventative rather than puni-
tive or compensatory, a rule of strict liability under respondeat superior principles would
appear to be counter-productive. See text accompanying notes 31-32 infra. See generally B
& B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1978) (discussing OSHA's
preventative nature).
30 594 F.2d at 401.
3, Id. at 399. The Fourth Circuit noted the congressional purpose behind OSHA, stated
in 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976), of assuring safe working conditions "so far as possible . . ."
and implying that Congress meant to limit OSHA sanctions to situations where some practi-
cal remedial benefit could be realized. 594 F.2d at 399.
32 594 F.2d at 399.
33 Id. at 403.
34 Id.
"' See text accompanying notes 51 & 56 infra. See also note 48 infra (discussing em-
ployer knowledge and relationship to other factors which are considered in OSHA
proceedings).
36 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1979). Section 2200.73(a) provides that the Secretary must
carry the burden of proof in all proceedings commenced by a notice of contest. Cf. §
2200.73(b) (where proceedings are commenced by petition for modification of abatement
period, petitioner has burden of establishing necessity of such modification).
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Health Review Commission (OSHRC),3 7 which placed the burden on the
Secretary to show how a company could have improved its safety program
and to demonstrate the feasibility and likely utility of such measures.3 8 In
reversing the Commission's finding against Ocean, the Fourth Circuit
stated that the record failed to show that the company could have
foreseen the accident.3 9
Additionally, the Fourth Circuit found that the Commission acted
unfairly by failing to inform Ocean that the adequacy of its safety
program would be an issue in the review proceeding. 0 The court stated
that the issue of safety program adequacy was not before the ALJ and
that the Commission's holding against Ocean for failure to carry the
burden of proof bought up the issue for the first time.41 Again citing
National Realty, the court found that the Secretary's failure to amend
the pleadings or otherwise bring the company's safety program into issue
during the ALJ or Review Commission proceedings prejudiced Ocean.42
The Fourth Ciruit reasoned that if Ocean had known that the safety
program was at issue when the parties first realized that liability for the
foreman's oversight was of central importance, the result of the trial
might have differed.
43
-7 489 F.2d 1257, 1268 (D.C. Cir. 1973); see Fourth Circuit Review-Administrative
Law, supra note 1, at 398 n.47 (discussing National Realty); note 43 infra.
" 594 F.2d at 402. The Secretary attempted to distinguish National Realty as a general
duty case, arguing that the broad scope of the general duty clause justified placing the bur-
den of proof on the government. Under the general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976),
an employer must furnish a workplace free from recognized hazards likely to cause death or
serious bodily harm. Cf. id. § 654(a)(2) (1976) (specific duty clause which requires employers
to conform to detailed health and safety standards promulgated by Secretary). The Fourth
Circuit summarily rejected the Secretary's argument. 594 F.2d at 402. Both National Realty
and Ocean addressed the burden of proof in specifying measures by which an employer
could improve its safety program, and in establishing the practicality of the improvements.
Therefore, the fact that an OSHA citation is based on a specific standard rather than the
general duty clause should not require a different allocation of the burden of proof as to the
same issue.
39 594 F.2d at 403. The Ocean court emphasized the stipulations that the forman's act
in leaving the housing door open was accidental rather than intentional and that Ocean did
not anticipate the occurrence.
40 Id.
41 Id. at 402.
42 Id. at 403.
43 Id. In National Realty, the D.C. Circuit ruled that deciding a case on a legal theory
or set of facts not presented at the OSHA administrative hearing is "patently unfair". 489
F.2d at 1267 n.40. The D.C. Circuit also held that when an employer learns the exadt nature
of the alleged violation after the hearing, the employer is unfairly deprived of an opportu-
nity to cross-examine the Secretary's witnesses or to present rebuttal evidence. Id. at 1267.
But see General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 461 (1st Cir. 1979). In General
Dynamics, an employer cited for a general duty clause violation defended on the grounds
that the incident was an isolated occurrence of employee misbehavior. Id. at 457. See also
text accompanying note 52 infra (discussing General Dynamics). The First Circuit rejected
the employer's charge that the Review Commission acted improperly in affirming the gen-
eral duty citation on the basis of safety program inadequacy. The court pointed out that.
although the citation had not referred to the employer's safety program, the Secretary
19801
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Ocean Electric is illustrative of a situation which commonly arises in
OSHA litigation and which results in conflicting analysis by the courts."
The rule which exculpates employers from liability for unforeseeable
employee misconduct has a sound policy basis, which is rooted in the
notion that unpreventable hazards should not result in OSHA sanctions.4
5
Since OSHA is remedial in nature, sanction should not apply against an
employer for unpreventable safety violations.4' Unfortunately, a morass
of contradictory and unclear case law has obscured the basic concept of
preventability.47 Courts have utilized a variety of terms and theories as
analytical tools when dealing with cases involving employee-generated
violations. For example, when an employer pleads lack of responsibility
for an OSHA violation, the courts have used such language as
"idiosyncratic behavior," "foreseeability," "knowledge," and "isolated
brief violation" in making their decisions.4 Each of these terms, however,
bears on the issue of preventability. In every instance, the courts appear
to be concerned with whether, through reasonable precautionary
measures, the violation could have been prevented.4 9 The difficulty of
brought the issue into contention at the review proceeding. 599 F.2d at 461. Thus, in con-
trast to Ocean Electric, the employer in General Dynamics was aware that safety program
adequacy was at issue. See 594 F.2d at 402 (issue of safety program adequacy first brought
into Ocean case in Review Commission opinion finding against employer for failure to carry
burden of proof).
4 See generally ROTHSTmIN, supra note 4, § 90, at 118; Employer Liability, supra note
4, at 614-30.
" See text accompanying notes 31-32 supra.
48 See B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364, 1371 (5th Cir. 1978) (emphasiz-
ing OSHA's remedial and preventative purpose).
47 See generally General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453 (1st Cir. 1979);
Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396 (4th Cir. 1979); Dunlop v. Rockwell
Int'l, 540 F.2d 1283 (6th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsea), 511 F.2d 1139 (9th Cir.
1975); Interstate Roofing Co., [1978] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 22,803, at 27,536
(1978); Ocean Elec. Corp., [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 20,167, at 23,992
(1975); Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co., [1974-75] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
19,203, at 22,956 (1975); Mississippi Valley Erection Co., [1973-74] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC.
(CCH) 1 17,098, at 21,748 (1973). See also notes 27, 28, & 43 supra; notes 51, 52, & 62 infra.
48 See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 462 (1st Cir. 1979) ("idi-
osyncratic conduct"); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1018 (7th Cir.
1975) ("foreseeability"); Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsea), 511 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1975)
("knowledge"); Standard Glass Co., [1971-73] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 15,146, at
20,220 (1972) ("isolated, brief violation"). The relationship between these words may be
illustrated in somewhat simplified form. If employee misbehavior is idiosyncratic and is an
isolated occurrence, then the act is not foreseeable. See generally ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4,
§ 90, at 118-19; Employer Liability, supra note 4, at 621. If the employer was unaware of
the accident at the time of its occurrence, and the accident was not foreseeable, then the
employer had neither actual nor constructive knowledge of the event. Finally, if the viola-
tion was unforeseeable and the employer had no knowledge of the occurrence, then the vio-
lation was unpreventable and therefore not culpable. See, e.g., Howard P. Foley, Co., [1977-
78] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 21,862, at 26,339, 26,341 (1977) (violation unprevent-
able because not reasonably foreseeable). Problems exist, however, because courts have not
been consistent in the terminology used to analyze cases involving employer liability under
OSHA for employee caused violations.
" See, e.g., National Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 (D.C. Cir.
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analysis is intensified because courts have reached varying conclusions in
allocating the burden of proof, depending on which terminology is used in
evaluating the case.50 Ocean illustrates this difficulty. The federal circuit
courts generally agree that the Secretary must prove employer knowledge
as a matter bearing on foreseeability and preventability in order to
sustain liabiltiy under an OSHA citation.51 On the other hand, the
Review Commission regards "isolated employee misconduct" as an
affirmative defense to be proven by the employer.52 Ocean Electric is a
1973) (Congress only intended to require elimination of preventable hazards); ROTHSTmN,
supra note 4, § 90, at 119 (unfair to penalize employer for unpreventable conditions).
50 Cf. Ocean Elec. Corp. v. Secretary of Labor, 594 F.2d 396, 403 (4th Cir. 1979) (Secre-
tary must prove foreseeability); Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsea), 511 F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir.
1975) (Secretary must prove employer knowledge); Floyd S. Pike Elec. Contr. Inc., [1978]
Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 22,805, at 27,541, 27,543-44 (1978) (employer must prove
unpreventable employee misconduct); Mississippi Valley Erection Co., [1973-74] Occ. SA".
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 17,098, at 21,748, 21,750 (employer must prove isolated
occurrence).
51 See, e.g., Dunlop v. Rockwell Int'l 540 F.2d 1283, 1289 (6th Cir. 1976); Home Plumb-
ing & Heating v. OSHRC 528 F.2d 564, 571 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. OSHRC (Alsea), 511
F.2d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 1975). Alsea involved a lumber company charged with several seri-
ous violations of specific standards under 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976) (special duty clause).
The Ninth Circuit held that employer knowledge is an element of all OSHA violations re-
gardless of their severity. See note 36 supra. Under the Ninth Circuit's view, the Secretary
has at least the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case before the burden of going
forward shifts to the employer. 511 F.2d at 1143. Alsea has been characterized as the lead-
ing case on employer knowledge involving employee misconduct. See ROTHSTEIN, supra note
4, § 90, at 121. The Fifth Circuit expressly adopted the Ninth Circuit's position that the
Secretary must prove employer knowledge. 528 FY2d at 571 (violation of trench shoring stan-
dard). In Rockwell, the Sixth Circuit also followed the Ninth Circuit's reasoning in affirming
a Commission decision vacating a citation for failure to provide respirators for employees.
The Rockwell court found that the Secretary must prove employer knowledge for both seri-
ous and trivial violations of the Act. 540 F.2d at 1289-91.
52 See, e.g., Briscoe/Arrace/Conduit, [1977-78] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
21,631, at 25,982 (1977); Robert W. Winzinger, Inc., [1976-77] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC.
(CCH) 20,929, at 25,133 (1976); Weatherhead Co., [1976-77] Occ. SA. & HEALTH DEC.
(CCH) 1 20,784, at 24,921 (1976); Murphy Pacific Marine Salvage Co., [1974-75] Occ. SAP. &
HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 11 19,203, at 22,956 (1975); Mississippi Valley Erection Co., [1973-74]
Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 17,098, at 21,748 (1973). The rationale for placing the
burden of proof on the employer rather than the Secretary is that the former has better
access to information relevant to a particular defense. See Murphy Pacific Marine, [1974-75]
Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) % 19,205, at 22,958 (1975) (Moran, C., concurring).
The Commission regards the affirmative defense of isolated employee misconduct as
containing three elements. First, there must be an isolated, brief violation of a safety stan-
dard by an employee. Second, the employer must have no knowledge of the violation. Fi-
nally, the violation must be contrary to an adequate and uniformly enforced work rule. See
ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, § 90, at 119-24; Employer Liability, supra note 4, at 622-23.
Courts commonly have looked to an employer's safety program when the isolated occur-
rence defense is raised. See, e.g., General Dynamics Corp. v. OSHRC, 599 F.2d 453, 459 (1st
Cir. 1979) (safety training relevant whenever employer defends on basis of idiosyncratic be-
havior); Horne Plumbing & Heating Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564, 568-69 (5th Cir. 1976)
(noting employer's excellent safety program); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520
F.2d 1011, 1017 (7th Cir. 1975) (adequacy of safety program viewed as crucial); National
Realty & Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d 1257, 1266 n.37 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (hazardous em-
ployee conduct may be considered preventable by adequate safety training).
1980]
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typical isolated employee misconduct case. The first two elements of the
defense which the Commission requires, an isolated, brief violation and
lack of knowledge, were stipulated in Ocean.53 Ocean's safety training was
the only element of the isolated occurrence defense in contention.
5
4
Safety program adequacy has been directly linked to the basic concept of
preventability.5 5 Courts have considered hazardous employee conduct to
be preventable, even in the absence of actual knowledge, if an adequate
safety program would have taught the employee to avoid such conduct.56
The Fourth Circuit's decision regarding the Secretary's burden of proof
recognizes this link between preventability and safety program adequacy.
When a question arises concerning safety program adequacy, the
Fourth Circuit's holding in Ocean allows the Secretary to require that the
employer fulfill the "burden of production" by coming forward with all
relevant information on the matter.57 Under the National Realty test
relied on in Ocean Electric, the Secretary has the "burden of persuasion"
and must affirmatively demonstrate the requirements of an adequate
safety program, as well as the feasibility and likely utility of these
requirements." Finally, the Secretary must prove that the employer's
program did not meet these requirements.5 9 In Ocean, the Secretary
presented no evidence on any of these points.6 0
53 594 F.2d at 398.
An inadequate safety program may indicate that violation of a safety standard by an
employee is foreseeable. See Ocean Elec. Corp., [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH)
20,167, at 23,992, 23,994. See also Horne Plumbing & Heating, Inc. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d 564,
569 (5th Cir. 1976); Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d 1011, 1018 (6th Cir.
1975).
51 See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d at 1018; National Realty &
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266; Howard P. Foley Co., [1977-78] Occ. SAF. &
HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 21,862, at 26,339 (1977); RoTHSTEIN, supra note 4, § 90, at 122.
56 See Brennan v. Butler Lime & Cement Co., 520 F.2d at 1017; National Realty &
Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 489 F.2d at 1266 n.37.
51 594 F.2d at 403 n.4. See also Danco Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 586 F.2d 1243, 1247 n.6
(8th Cir. 1978) (upholding Commission determination that employer must come forward
with evidence to rebut Secretary's prima facie showing of inadequate safety training and
supervision).
51 594 F.2d at 402.
" See 489 F.2d at 1268.
"0 In ruling that the employer had failed to establish the adequacy of its safety pro-
gram, the Commission noted several "requirements" which the evidence did not address.
[1975-76] Occ. SAr. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 20,167 at 23,994. For example, the Commission
did not know whether regular safety meetings were held and employees were required to
attend and discuss particular safety problems or whether specific rules were established and
enforced. Id. By speculating about the particular requirements of an adequate safety pro-
gram, the Commission engaged in a practice which had been specifically condemned in Na-
tional Realty. The D.C. Circuit noted that the Secretary has considerable latitude before
and during a hearing to alter the pleadings and legal theories involved. 489 F.2d at 1267.
The court reasoned that an employer cannot adequately defend itself when the employer
only learns of the exact nature of the alleged violation after the hearing. Id. Thus, the Com-
mission may not serve as an expert witness for the Secretary. Id. at n.40. Rather, the Secre-
tary must prove that demonstrably feasible procedures would have materially reduced the
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Given Ocean's holding as to the burden of proof, the Fourth Circuit
most likely will overturn cases which have held against employers for
failure to prove isolated employee misconduct as an affirmative defense.
The Ocean decision, however, should result in friction between the
Fourth Circuit and the Review Commission. The "isolated employee
misconduct defense" has been characterized as the most important of all
substantive defenses to OSHA charges and has been used widely in
OSHA proceedings.6 1 Recent Commission decisions show no sign of
abandoning the affirmative defense requirement.
6 2
The Commission's maintenance of the "isolated employee misconduct
defense," requiring that the employer prove safety program adequacy, is
contrary to the requirement that the Secretary prove employer knowledge
of OSHA violations, as consistently stated by the federal circuit courts.
6 3
Thus, the Fourth Circuit properly reallocated the burden of proof on the
issues of safety program adequacy, foreseeability, and knowledge to the
Secretary. The Ocean court's holding is in keeping with the general
premise that liability should not attach for unforeseeable and
unpreventable OSHA violations and that the burden of proof on this
issue should rest with the Secretary.
6
JEFFREY H. GRAY
B. Broad Scope of General Safety Standards-Applicability in
OSHA Litigation
Congress enacted the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970
(OSHA)1 to promote safe and healthful working conditions. OSHA
likelihood that such conduct would have occurred. 489 F.2d at 1267. The "demonstrably
feasible measures" referred to by the National Realty court have been defined as enforce-
ment techniques which may reasonably be required of employers faced with employee non-
compliance problems, given the character of the hazard and the economics of the industry.
See Note, Employee Noncompliance with OSHA Safety Standards, 90 HARv. L. REV. 1041,
1049-50 (1977).
61 See ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, § 90, at 118.
42 In 1978, three years after deciding Ocean Electric, the Commission decided an al-
most identical case and reached the same result. In Interstate Roofing Co., [1978] Occ. SAs.
& HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 22,803 at 27,536 (1978), the employer was cited for an OSHA viola-
tion created by one of its supervisory employees. The Commission held that the employer
had the burden of proving that the supervisor's conduct was preventable and that to carry
this burden, the employer must show that its employees had received "adequate" safety
training. Id. at 27,538. The OSHRC concluded by ruling against the employer for failure to
prove that an adequate safety program had been maintained. Id.
63 See Ocean Elec. Corp., [1975-76] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 21,167, at
23,996-97 (1975) (Moran, C., dissenting); ROTHSTEIN, supra note 4, § 77, at 98 n.53.
See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976). The 91st Congress enacted OSHA, and President Nixon
signed the Act into law on December 29, 1970. More Americans had been killed on the job
in the four years prior to OSHA's passage than in the Vietnam War. In addition, industrial
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charges the Secretary of Labor (Secretary) with promulgation2 and en-
forcement3 of health and safety standards, and requires employers4 to
accidents disabled more than two million persons annually, and during 1970, there were
approximately 390,000 victims of job-related disease. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LA-
BOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT, H.R. Doc. No. 91-1291, 91st Cong., 2d Sess.
14-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as H. REP.]. Lost wages amounted to over $1.5 billion per
year, and the annual loss to the Gross National Product was over $8 billion. See S. REP. No.
1282, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2, reprinted in [1970] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 5177, 5178
[hereinafter cited as S. REP.]. The Occupational Safety and Health Act took effect on April
28, 1971 and represented the culmination of the federal government's concern for job health
and safety. See generally Comment, The Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970: An
Overview, 4 CUM. SAM. L. REV. 525 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Overview]. Federal protec-
tion of safety and health is authorized by the commerce clause of the United States Consti-
tution. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3. Congress determined that work-related injuries and
sickness impose a substantial burden on interstate commerce through lost production, wage
loss, medical expenses, and disability compensation payments. 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1976).
Under the commerce clause, OSHA is applicable to any business affecting commerce among
the states. The Act has extremely broad applicability and represents the full exercise of the
commerce power. See id. § 651(b). Only a limited number of employees are outside the Act's
jurisdiction. Workers whose employment is regulated by other federal and certain state
agencies, 29 U.S.C. § 653(b)(1) (1976), as well as federal, state, and local employees, id. §
652(5), are exempt from OSHA regulation. OSHA applies to over 4 million businesses and
over 57 million employees. See Overview, supra at 528.
2 29 U.S.C. § 655 (1976). Any interested person, a representative of any employer or
employee organization, a nationally recognized standards-producing organization, the Secre-
tary of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), or a state or political subdivision may sub-
mit written information regarding promulgation of a specific health or safety standard. Id. §
655(b)(1). When the Secretary determines the need for a specific standard, he may appoint
an advisory committee to assist in development of this standard. Id. The 15 member advi-
sory committee shall include one or more designees of the Secretary of HEW and shall
include an equal number of persons qualified by experience and affiliation to present the
views of both employers and employees. The Secretary of Labor may also appoint other
qualified persons to assist in the committee's work. These members may include representa-
tives of professional organizations of technicians and professionals specializing in occupa-
tional safety or health, as well as representatives of nationally recognized standards-produc-
ing organizations. Id. § 656(b). The advisory committee submits recommendations to the
Secretary within 90 days from the date of the committee's appointment. Id. § 655(b)(1). The
Secretary's proposed rule is published in the Federal Register, and interested persons have
30 days to submit written data or comments. Id. § 655(b)(2). During this 30 day period,
interested parties may file written objections with the Secretary regarding the proposed
rule. The objecting party must state the grounds for the objection and may request a public
hearing. The Secretary must then publish in the Federal Register a notice specifying the
occupational safety or health standard to which objections have been filed and a hearing
requested. This notice must specify the time and place for the requested hearing. Id. §
655(b)(3). The Secretary has 60 days following expiration of this 30 day comment/objection
period or following the completion of any hearing which results to issue a new standard or
to make a determination that a rule should not be issued. Any standard which is promul-
gated may have a delayed effective date in order to give employers and employees an oppor-
tunity to familiarize themselves with the standard's requirements. Id. § 655(b)(4). The
above-described procedure for promulgation of standards also applies to the modification or
revocation of any OSHA standard. Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 657-659 (1976). The Secretary has broad powers to inspect and investi-
gate places of employment to insure conformance with the Act. In enacting OSHA, Congress
found that government personnel need a "right of entry" into any place of employment
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within the Act's jurisdiction in order to ascertain safety and health conditions and the ex-
tent of compliance. See id. § 657. Under 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976), the Secretary or his
authorized compliance officer is authorized, upon presentation of appropriate credentials, to
enter any workplace at reasonable times and without delay. Upon entry, the Secretary may
inspect "within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner" all pertinent conditions,
structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment and materials therein, and may ques-
tion privately any employer or employees. The Supreme Court has recently held that the
owner of a business has not, by necessary utilization of employees in his operation, thrown
open to warrantless inspection by the Secretary those areas where employees alone are per-
mitted. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 315 (1978).
During an OSHA inspection a representative of the employer and a representative of
his employees must be given an opportunity to accompany the compliance officer. 29 U.S.C.
§ 657(e) (1976). The physical inspection of the workplace is commonly known as the "walk-
around". See Comment, Occupational Safety and Health Inspections, 9 GONZ. L. REV. 555,
561 (1974). Following the walk-around, at a final meeting known as the closing conference,
the compliance officer must inform the employer of the OSHA violations discovered during
the inspection. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.7(e) (1979). At the closing conference, the employer is given
an opportunity to bring any pertinent information regarding conditions of the workplace to
the compliance officer's attention. Id. Either the employer or affected employees are given
the right by 29 C.F.R. § 1903.19 (1979) to request an informal meeting with the Assistant
Regional Director of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration, see id. §
1903.21(f), following an inspection. Discussion at this informal conference may cover any
issues raised by an inspection, citation, notice of proposed penalty, or notice of intention to
contest. Id. § 1903.19. Regardless of whether the employer or the employee requests the
conference, the Assistant Regional Director is required under § 1903.19 to afford the other
party an opportunity to participate. Either side may be represented by counsel. Id. There
are no published statistics on the effect which these informal conferences have had on the
selection or rejection of OSHA citations ultimately sent to the employer. See note 16 infra.
The opportunity is clearly present for management or labor to take a position of advocacy,
particularly if legal counsel is present. In addition, the informal conference would provide
an opportunity to furnish the Occupational Safety and Health Administration with addi-
tional information concerning the employer's safety record. Such information might have a
bearing on whether the employer receives a "serious" or "non-serious" citation. See 1 R.
HOGAN & B. HOGAN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT § 5.01[5][d], 5-27 (1979) [here-
inafter cited as HOGAN & HOGAN].
OSHA enforcement procedures have been the subject of substantial commentary. See,
e.g., Bobrick & Dunphy, OSHA Inspections-Applicable Law Regarding Notice, Right to
Accompany, Payments to Union Representatives, Post Inspection Meetings, in PROCEED-
INGS OF THE ABA NAT'L INST. ON OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW 7 (1976); Carter,
Advising Employers Under OSHA, in OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT 7 (PLI No.
84) (1972); 1 CONNOLLY & CROWELL, A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND
HEALTH ACT 59 (1977); B. FELLNER & D. SAVELSON, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH-LAw
AND PRACTICE 29 (1976); M. ROTHSTEIN, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH LAW §§ 201-33
(197 ) [hereinafter cited as ROTHSTEIN]; Hunt, The Elusive Burden of Proof Under the Oc-
cupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 30 Sw. L. J. 693, 694 (1976) [hereinafter cited as
Hunt]; Moran, The Legal Process for Enforcement of the Occupational Safety and.Health
Act of 1970, 9 GoNz. L. REv. 349 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Moran]. See also Atlas Roofing
Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442, 446 (1976) (discussing OSHA enforcement procedures).
4 29 U.S.C. § 652(5) (1976) defines "employer" as a "person" engaged in a business
affecting commerce who has employees. The United States and any state or political subdi-
vision are expressly excluded from the definition. Id. The term "person" is described under
§ 652(4) as one or more individuals, partnerships, associations, corporations, business trusts,
legal representatives, or any organized group of persons. 29 C.F.R. § 1975.5(c) (1979) sets
out factors to be used in determining whether an entity is exempt from employer status, and
hence OSHA jurisdiction, as a state or political subdivision. These factors include whether
the entity makes a profit, pays taxes, pays employee salaries, and whether the entity is
administered by a public official. Id. See generally 1 HOGAN & HOGAN, supra note 3, §§ 3.01-
.02; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, §§ 12-14.
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conform to these standards.5 Where specific standards promulgated by
the Secretary are inapplicable, employers may nevertheless be subject to
OSHA's general duty clause,6 which mandates that employers furnish a
workplace free from recognized,hazards likely to cause serious physical
harm.
The safety standards promulgated by the Secretary include both gen-
eral and specific requirements.7 Where a potential for conflict exists be-
tween general and specific standards, employers sometimes face major
problems in determining their responsibilities under OSHA." The Fourth
Circuit recently provided guidance for employers in Bristol Steel & Iron
Works, Inc. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Commission
(OSHRC),9 holding that general standards can be used to extend em-
ployer duties well beyond the scope of more specific provisions.10
An OSHA officer inspected" a work site where Bristol was engaged in
skeletal steel erection"2 and observed two of Bristol's employees'" working
approximately sixteen feet above a stairwell.14 The employees were wear-
5 An employer's duties under OSHA are derived from two basic sources. First, under
OSHA's "specific duty" clause, § 654(a)(2), an employer must conform to the detailed
health and safety standards promulgated by the Secretary. 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (1976).
Second, where no promulgated standards apply, an employer is subject to the requirements
of the § 654(a)(1) "general duty clause". Id. § 654(a)(1); see text accompanying note 6 infra.
Nearly all OSHA enforcement is based on the specific duty clause. In 1974, for example,
fewer than one percent of all job safety citations included general duty clause allegations.
See Moran, supra note 3, at 349.
' 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). The Eighth Circuit has held that a "recognized hazard"
within the meaning of the general duty clause is not limited to one which can be recognized
directly by human senses without assistance of any technical instruments. American Smelt-
ing & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 510-11 (8th Cir. 1974). The general duty clause
covers the most flagrant situations for which the Secretary has not promulgated appropriate
regulations. Anning-Johnson Co. v. OSHRC, 516 F.2d 1081, 1086 (7th Cir. 1975). See gener-
ally Andrews & Cross, Defending an Employer Against an Alleged Violation of the General
Duty Clause, 9 GONZ. L. REv. 399 (1974); Morey, The General Duty Clause of the Occupa-
tional Safety Health Act of 1970, 86 HARV. L. REV. 988 (1973).
7 Subpart C of the 29 C.F.R. § 1926 (1979) construction regulations sets out general
safety and health provisions for such areas as safety training (§ 1926.21), fire prevention (§
1926.24), illumination (§ 1926.26), sanitation (§ 1926.27), and personal protective equipment
(§ 1926.28). Other Subparts under the § 1926 construction regulations, however, deal specifi-
cally with particular construction processes or areas. These specific provisions include Sub-
part P (Excavations, Trenching, and Shoring), Subpart R (Steel Erection), and Subpart U
(Blasting and Use of Explosives).
1 See text accompanying notes 21-24 & 27-38 infra; note 91 infra. See also Builders
Steel Co. v. Mgrsball, 575 F.2d 663, 665 (8th Cir. 1978); note 32 infra.
- 601 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1979).
10 Id. at 721.
" OSHA inspections of work sites are authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1976); see note
3 supra.
12 See note 23 infra.
"8 OSHA defines "employee" as an employee of an employer whose business affects
commerce. 29 U.S.C. § 652(6) (1976). In § 654(b), employees are required to comply with all
OSHA rules and regulations, but there is no provision for enforcing this requirement.
14 601 F.2d at 719. Bristol's employees were rigging a float scaffold and were working on
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ing, but not using, safety belts or other fall protection equipment.15 The
OSHA inspector cited 16 Bristol for violation of the section 1926.28(a) gen-
eral construction safety standard which mandates wearing "appropriate
personal protective equipment" to reduce employee exposure to
hazards.'1 Bristol contested the citation", before an administrative law
judge (ALJ).19 The ALJ affirmed the citation, reasoning that under the
facts presented, no specific safety standard would preempt the section
1926.28(a) general requirement mandating the use of appropriate protec-
tive equipment. 0
On review, the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission
a wall, 12 to 18 inches wide. The wall was located on the second floor of a building and was
approximately 16 feet above concrete stairs. Id.
15 Id. Bristol stipulated that the two employees were exposed to the hazard of falling
and that if such a fall had occurred, there existed a substantial probability of serious injury
or death. Id.
Is Issuance of a citation for OSHA violations is authorized by 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1976).
Under § 658(a), each citation must be in writing and must describe with particularity the
provision of the chapter, standard, rule, regulation, or order which the employer allegedly
violated. The citation must also fix a reasonable time for abatement of the violation. The
OSHA citation has been compared to a ticket for a traffic offense. See Moran, supra note 3,
at 350. The citation received by the OSHA violator lists a specific monetary penalty which
has been previously established for the alleged violation. The OSHA violator then has the
option of paying the fine or appearing in court on a specified date if he desires a hearing.
Should he fail to do either by that date, the fine is automatically due and payable. Moran
notes that this system, which has gained increasing popularity in recent years, favors judi-
cial economy by expediting the disposition of cases. Id.
17 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1979). Section 1926.28(a) provides that the employer must
require the wearing of "appropriate" personal protective equipment wherever there is an
exposure to hazardous conditions. The Fifth Circuit upheld § 1926.28(a) against a charge of
unconstitutional vagueness in B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.
1978). The B&B court applied a reasonable man test in determining that the requirements
of § 1926.28(a) were not unforeseeable, and hence, not in violation of due process for being
unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1367; see note 43 infra.
Is An employer is authorized to contest an OSHA citation under 29 U.S.C. § 659(a)
(1976). If an employer notifies the Secretary that he intends to contest a citation, the Secre-
tary must immediately forward this information to the Occupational Safety and Health Re-
view Commission (Commission) id. § 659(c); see note 21 infra. After being advised of the
notice of contest, the OSHRC must afford the employer an opportunity for a hearing before
an administrative law judge (ALJ) 29 U.S.C. § 659(c); see note 19 infra.
29 The Review Commission appoints an administrative law judge to give a preliminary
review of an OSHA citation. 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979). There are 45 ALJs
located in 10 offices throughout the country. The ALJs have life tenure and hold hearings in
at least 75 cities. See Hunt, supra note 3, at 694 n.11. The ALJ's report becomes the Review
Commission's final order and is appealable to a federal circuit within 30 days unless the
Commission chooses to exercise its discretionary power of review. 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(i) (Cum.
Supp. 1979). In practice, the ALJs render the final decision in over 90% of OSHA cases. See
Moran, supra note 3, at 352.
20 Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. [1975-76] Occ. SA'. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 20,437,
at 24,400-01 (1976). The ALJ noted that where the § 1926.28(a) general construction safety
standard applies, workers have the right to its protection unless a particular specific stan-
dard encompasses the same working conditions. Id. at 24,401.
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(Commission)2 affirmed the decision of the ALJ by a split vote.2" Voting
for affirmance, Commissioner Cleary felt that without an applicable spe-
cific safety standard, the section 1926.28(a) general construction safety
standard was controlling.22 Commissioner Barnako voted to reverse, rea-
soning that the Secretary covered the entire subject of fall protection for
steel erection with specific safety standards for that part of the construc-
tion industry, and that these specific provisions did not require protective
equipment at heights below twenty-five feet.2 ' Thus, Barnako would have
held that these specific regulations, found in Subpart R of the section
1926 construction standards, were exclusive in setting out fall protection
precautions for employers engaged in steel erection.25
On appeal the Fourth Circuit reversed the Review Commission's deci-
sion against Bristol and remanded the case for further consideration. 26
2 The Commission is established under 29 U.S.C. § 661(a) (1976) as a body of three
members, appointed for six year terms by the President, with the advice and consent of the
Senate. The President designates one Commission member as Chairman. The principal of-
fice of the OSHRC is in the District of Columbia. The Commission is authorized, however,
under OSHA to hold hearings in other locations. Id. § 661(c). Any Commission member may
order review of an ALJ decision, and review may be granted upon application by an em-
ployer or upon the Commission's own motion. 29 U.S.C.A. § 661(i) (Cum. Supp. 1979); see
Hunt, supra note 3, at 698; Moran, supra note 3, at 352; ROTHSTEIN, supra note 3, at ch. 16;
Overview, supra note 1, at 530.
While under § 661(a), the Review Commission is supposed to be a three member body,
Commissioner Moran's tenure expired in April, 1977 and he was not reappointed. See 2
HOGAN & HOGAN, supra note 3, § 11.0111]. Moran's position was still vacant at the time the
Bristol case came before the Review Commission. Thus, there was not a third member to
break the deadlock between Commissioners Cleary and Barnako. On August 31, 1977, Presi-
dent Carter appointed Commissioner Cleary to take over the duties of OSHRC chairman.
Commissioner Barnako indicated that he would continue to serve on the Review Commis-
sion until his term expires in 1981. On September 7, 1977, President Carter nominated, and
the Senate later confirmed, Bertram R. Cottine to fill Commissioner Moran's vacant posi-
tion. See 2 HOGAN & HOGAN, supra note 3, § 11.01 n.5a (1979 ed. Cum. Supp.).
22 Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc., [1977-78] Occ. SAP. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 1 22,240,
at 26,764 (1977).
22 Id. at 26,765. In arguing for affirmance of the citation against Bristol, Cleary felt that
Bristol's employees were not actually engaged in steel erection. Cleary concluded that the
scaffold work being done was only preparatory to steel erection itself. Id. The Fourth Circuit
did not share Cleary's interpretation, and specifically stated that Bristol was engaged in
skeletal steel erection. 601 F.2d at 719.
24 Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. [1977-78] Occ. SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) 22,240,
at 26,765 (1977).
25 Subpart R of § 1926 requires the following types of fall protection. If the structure is
a tiered, i.e., multifloored building, not adaptable to temporary flooring, and scaffolds are
not used, safety belts must be used where the fall distance is more than 25 feet or 2 stories.
29 C.F.R. § 1926.750(b)(1)(ii) (1979). If the structure is a tiered building which is adaptable
to temporary flooring, then a tightly planked and substantial floor is to be installed within 2
stories or 30 feet below or directly under that portion of each tier of beams on which work is
being performed. Id. § 1926.750(b)(2)(i). Safety belts are to be used when gathering and
stacking temporary floor planks. Id. § 1926.750(b)(2)(iii). The employer must supply safety
belts to employees who are working on float scaffolds. Id. § 1926.752(k).
28 Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717, 724 (4th Cir. 1979). The
Fourth Circuit assumed jurisdiction to review the decision of an equally divided Commis-
[Vol. XXXVII
FOURTH CIRCUIT REVIEW
The Fourth Circuit agreed with Commissioner Cleary that the Secretary's
specific steel erection standards did not -supplant the section 1926.28(a)
general construction requirement. 27 The court specifically rejected Bris-
tol's argument that the entire area of fall protection for steel erectors was
specifically covered by Subpart R.28 The Fourth Circuit felt that Bristol's
argument ran counter to legislative policy,29 noting that OSHA's purpose
was to assure safe and healthful working conditions.30 The Bristol court
explained that OSHA is remedial and preventative in natures" and should
be construed liberally in favor of the workers sought to be protected.
3 2
sion, despite a jurisdictional challenge by the Secretary. Id. at 720 n.7. The Secretary based
the challenge on 29 U.S.C. § 661(e) (1976) which provides that official action may be taken
by the Commision only by the affirmative vote of at least two members. The Secretary con-
tended that absent the requisite two votes, there has been no official Commission action and
therefore, no basis for appeal. See Cox Bros. v. Secretary of Labor, 574 F.2d 465, 467 (9th
Cir. 1978); Shaw Constr. Co. v. OSHRC, 534 F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1976). However,
the Fourth Circuit adopted the position that an equally divided Commission vote consti-
tutes an affirmance of the ALJ's decision, although the decision of the Commission has no
precedential value. 601 F.2d at 720 n.7. The Fourth Circuit rejected the Secretary's chal-
lenge to jurisdiction on the basis of an earlier decision. See George Hyman Constr. Co. v.
OSHRC, 582 F.2d 834, 836-37 (4th Cir. 1978). In Hyman the Fourth Circuit expressed
doubt that Congress intended the quorum requirement of 29 U.S.C. § 661(e) to serve as a
bar to judicial review. 582 F.2d at 837. See Fourth Circuit Review-Labor, 36 WASH. & LEE
L. REv. 634, 635-36 (1979). Bristol apparently settles the question of the appealability of
split Commission decisions in the Fourth Circuit, holding such decisions reviewable. In the
Hyman case, all three Commissioners voted, although they split their vote three ways. Id. at
635. The Bristol case put to rest in the Fourth Circuit the possibility that where only two
Commissioners vote, there is not a reviewable "Commission decision". But cf. Cox Bros. v.
Secretary of Labor, 574 F.2d 465, 467 (9th Cir. 1978); Shaw Constr., Inc. v. OSHRC, 534
F.2d 1183, 1185-86 (5th Cir. 1976) (requiring affirmative vote of at least two commissioners
to constitute reviewable "official action" by Commission).
1 601 F.2d at 721.
:8 Id.
29 Id.; see note 1 supra.
:0 601 F.2d at 721 (citing 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (1976)).
31 601 F.2d at 721. See also B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364, 1370 (5th
Cir. 1978) (since Act is remedial and preventative rather than punative in nature, tort law
concept of reasonable man may not be used in broadest sense to establish liability under
OSHA); Marshall v. Cities Service Oil Co., 577 F.2d 126, 130 (10th Cir. 1978); REA Express,
Inc. v. Brennan, 495 F.2d 822, 825 (2d Cir. 1974).
32 601 F.2d at 721. See also Irvington Moore v. OSHRC, 556 F.2d 431, 435 (9th Cir.
1977) (broad construction given to OSHA standard dealing with point of operation guarding
on industrial metal press); Southern Ry. v. OSHRC, 539 F.2d 335, 338 (4th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 429 U.S. 999 (1976); American Smelting & Ref. Co. v. OSHRC, 501 F.2d 504, 511 (8th
Cir. 1974) (recognized hazard under general duty clause may be one needing technical in-
struments to detect). A general canon of statutory construction requires that remedial stat-
utes be liberally construed in favor of their beneficiaries. See, e.g., A.H. Phillips, Inc. v.
Walling, 324 U.S. 490, 493 (1945); Reliable Coal Co. v. Morton, 478 F.2d 257, 262 (4th Cir.
1973); Wirtz v. Ti Ti Peat Humus Co., 373 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 389 U.S.
834 (1967). The Eighth Circuit has indicated, however, that the liberal interpretation rule
for remedial statutes is not always applicable. See Builders Steel Co. v. Marshall, 575 F.2d
663, 666 (8th Cir. 1978). In Builders, an employer engaged in steel erection was cited for a
violation of the 29 C.F.R. § 1926.105(a) (1979) construction industry standard which speci-
fies that where other protective measures are impractical, safety nets are to be provided at
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Bristol made the legal argument that under the section 1910.5(c)(1)
provision on interpretation of standards, an applicable specific regulation
prevails over any different general standard which might otherwise be
controlling.3 The Fourth Circuit, however, found the specific regulatory
provisions of Subpart R inapplicable to the facts of the Bristol case, since
the Subpart R provisions deal with precautionary measures to be taken at
heights of twenty-five feet or greater3 ' and Bristol's employees were work-
ing at a height of sixteen feet.3 5 Thus, the court relied on the language of
section 1910.5(c)(2), providing that if particular standards are prescribed
for an industry but are inapplicable to a given situation, then other stan-
dards may be utilized.3 6 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that reading the
section 1910.5(c) regulation on statutory interpretation in the manner
suggested by Bristol would prevent the Secretary from coping with a vari-
ety of hazards not covered by the specific standards." Hence, the court
concluded that the section 1926.28(a) general construction safety stan-
dard compliments the Subpart R specific fall protection standards deal-
ing with steel erection by requiring that appropriate protective equip-
ment be used to reduce hazards to employees working at heights below
twenty-five feet.38
workplaces above 25 feet in height. The employer contended that the specific Subpart R
steel erection standards should be controlling. Subpart R § 1926.750(b)(2)(i), see note 25
supra, requires precautionary measures to be taken where employers are working on tiered
structures at heights above 30 feet. Since Builders' employees were working at a height be-
low 30 feet, the company argued there was no violation of the applicable OSHA provisions.
575 F.2d at 665. In dealing with this conflict between OSHA standards, the Eighth Circuit
noted that where, as in Builders, ambiguity exists, the standards must be viewed in a more
critical manner despite their remedial nature. Id. at 666. The court remanded the case, how-
ever, for a determination of whether the Subpart R standard, which applied to multi-story
buildings, should also be applicable to the facts of the Builders case, which involved a single
story building. Id. at 667.
3 601 F.2d at 722. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c) (1979) reads in pertinent part as follows:
(1) If a particular standard is specifically applicable to a condition, practice,
means, method, operation, or process, it shall prevail over any different general
standard which might otherwise be applicable ....
(2) On the other hand, any standard shall apply according to its terms to any
. . . place of employment . . . even though particular standards are also pre-
scribed for the industry, as in Subpart B or Subpart R of this part, to the extent
that none of such particular standards applies . ...
34 601 F.2d at 720-21.
" See note 13 supra. Concurring in Bristol, Judge Widener noted that if a specific
standard had been applicable to the facts of the Bristol case, then under § 1910.5(c)(1) no
general standard could then be used to require another duty for a condition already covered
by the specific regulation. The concurring opinion was evidently reacting to footnote 11 of
the majority opinion, 601 F.2d at 721, which stated that specific standards insure a mini-
mum level of employee protection under recognized hazardous conditions. Judge Widener's
position that an applicable specific provision prevails over any potentially applicable general
regulation represents the accepted view. See, e.g., United States Steel Corp. v. OSHRC, 537
F.2d 780, 784 (3d Cir. 1976); McLean-Behm Steel Erectors, Inc., [1978] Occ. SAl. & HEALTH
DEC. (CCH) 23,139, at 27,956, 27,957-58.
6 601 F.2d at 722; see note 33 supra.




While the Fourth Circuit applied the section 1926.28(a) general safety
standard beyond the scope of the Subpart R specific regulations, the
court recognized that in order to satisfy due process, the standard should
be construed so as to give an employer reasonable notice of required
safety measures.3 9 The Bristol court pointed out that other federal circuit
courts require employers to take the precautions a reasonable man would
take under the general duty clause and the various general safety stan-
dards found in the Secretary's regulations.40 The Fourth Circuit declined,
however, to determine reasonableness solely on the custom and practice
of the particular industry involved. 41 The court reasoned that there may
be customary industry practices which fail to protect against generally
known hazards.42 Thus, the Bristol court imposed a duty on the employer
to look beyond the custom and practice of the industry and make an in-
dependent assessment of necessary safety precautions.
43
3, Id. at 722. See also B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364, 1367-69 (5th Cir.
1978) (construing § 1926.28(a) general construction safety standard); McLean Trucking Co.
v. OSHRC, 503 F.2d 8, 10-11 (4th Cir. 1974) (rejecting charge of unconstitutional vagueness
against personal protective equipment standard used in citation for failure to provide pro-
tective footwear); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1974)
(personal protective equipment standard mandating that employers provide protective foot-
wear not unconstitutionally vague).
40 601 F.2d at 722-23. See, e.g., B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d 1364, 1369-70
(5th Cir. 1978); American Airlines, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 578 F.2d 38, 41 (2d Cir. 1978);
Brennan v. Smoke-Craft, Inc., 530 F.2d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1976); Arkansas-Best Freight Sys-
tems, Inc. v. OSHRC, 529 F.2d 649, 655 (8th Cir. 1976); Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC,
512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st Cir. 1975); McLean Trucking Co. v. OSHRC, 503 F.2d 8, 10 (4th
Cir. 1974); Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1974).
4 601 F.2d at 723.
42 Id.
43 In support of the decision to impose a broad standard of employer duty when inter-
preting general safety and health standards, the Bristol court followed the First Circuit's
decision in Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir. 1975). In Cape &
Vineyard, the First Circuit used a reasonable man test in construing a general personal
protective equipment standard. The Cape & Vineyard court noted that industry custom
could normally be expected to establish the required'standard of conduct. The First Circuit
concluded, however, that where industry custom fails to take reasonable precautions against
generally known hazards, holding the employer to a higher standard than that of actual
practice is not unfair. Id. at 1152. The Fourth Circuit also cited the Ninth Circuit case of
Brennan v. Smoke-Craft, Inc., 530 F.2d 843, 845 (9th Cir. 1976), as authority for adoption of
a reasonable man standard which is not limited to industry custom and practice. 601 F.2d at
723. Whether Smoke-Craft supports the Fourth Circuit's position is unclear. In Smoke-
Craft, the employer was cited for violation of the § 1910.132(a) general personal protective
standard since management did not require sausage cutters operating a saw blade to wear
protective gloves. In reversing the Review Commission's order to vacate the citation, how-
ever, the Ninth Circuit noted that there was no relevant industry custom with which to
compare the employer's conduct. Smoke-Craft's procedure for using the saw was unique in
the sausage industry. Thus, the Ninth Circuit stated that in the absence of relevant industry
custom or practice for comparison, the court would have to determine whether a reasonable
man familiar with the industry would find it necessary to protect against the hazard. Ascer-
taining whether the court would have upheld the citation had there been an identifiable
industry custom with which Smoke-Craft was in compliance is therefore difficult.
The Fourth Circuit recognized that the position adopted on the standard of reasonable-
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The Bristol court imposed a heavy burden on employers by broadly
interpreting the applicability and scope of the general safety standard.
The court lightened the employer's task, however, by holding that the
Commission erred in allocating the burden of proof." Specifically, the
Fourth Circuit held that an employer should not be forced to prove, as an
affirmative defense, that protection by means of safety belts was infeasi-
ble.45 The Fourth Circuit reasoned that the Commission's holding ignored
the OSHA regulation clearly stating that the burden of proof shall rest
with the Secretary in all proceedings commenced by the filing of a notice
of contest.
46
Bristol's holding on the burden of proof issue followed the reasoning
of the D.C. Circuit in the landmark case of National Realty and Con-
struction Co. v. OSHRC.'7 In National Realty, which dealt with a viola-
tion of OSHA's general duty clause, the D.C. Circuit held that the Secre-
tary must produce evidence on all necessary elements of a violation.
48
Thus, the Secretary must not only set out the particular steps that an
employer could have taken to avoid citation but must also demonstrate
the utility of those measures.
49
In Bristol, the Fourth Circuit found no evidence in the record that a
reasonably prudent employer familiar with steel erection would have pro-
tected against the hazard of falling by the means specified in the cita-
tion.50 The Bristol court concluded that the Commission's finding of a
violation of the section 1926.28(a) general construction safety standard
was not supported by substantial evidence." Accordingly, the Fourth Cir-
cuit reversed the Commission's order and remanded the case for further
proceedings consistent with the opinion.52
ness was contrary to that of the Fifth Cirrcuit in B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d
1364 (5th Cir. 1978). See text accompanying notes 67-69 infra. In B&B, the Fifth Circuit
refused to go beyond customary industry practice in construing the § 1926.28(a) general
construction safety standard. The B&B court reasoned that where the government seeks to
encourage a higher standard of performance than is customary in a given industry, the
proper recourse is through the promulgation of specific standards. 583 F.2d at 1371.
" 601 F.2d at 723.
45 Id.
48 Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1978)).
4- 489 F.2d 1257 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In National Realty, the employer was cited for viola-
tion of OSHA's general duty clause, 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (1976). The citation alleged that
an employee was improperly permitted to ride on the running board of a front-end loader
while the loader was in operation. The employee died when the loader rolled over on top of
him. The evidence indicated that equipment riding by employees was contrary to company
policy. Faced with an employee's disregard of company safety policy, the National Realty
court concluded that the record failed to demonstrate what the employer could have done to
improve its safety policy, as well as the feasibility and likely utility of these measures. 489
F.2d at 1268. Therefore, the D.C. Circuit vacated the citation against National Realty. Id.
48 489 F.2d at 1267-68.
19 Id. at 1268.
50 601 F.2d at 724.
"' Id; see 29 U.S.C. § 660(a)(1976) (Commission findings of fact are conclusive if sup-
ported by substantial evidence).
52 601 F.2d at 724.
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Bristol's holding on the burden of proof issue conflicts with the Re-
view Commission's position, recently set out in S&H Riggers & Erectors,
Inc.5 3 S&H was the first case in which a majority of commissioners agreed
on an interpretation of the section 1926.28(a) general construction safety
standard.54 The Review Commission held that where citations are based
on a violation of section 1926.28(a), the Secretary must specify the appro-
priate form of personal protective equipment to eliminate the hazard.55
The Commission broke with precedent, however, by overruling previous
decisions which held that the Secretary must prove the feasibility and
likely utility of the recommended form of personal protective equip-
ment.56 The Commission now would require the employer to argue and
prove infeasibility as an affirmative defense.57 The Commission noted in
S&H that the previous position to the contrary was based on the reason-
ing of the National Realty case, which dealt with violations of OSHA's
general duty clause. 5 The Commission concluded that unlike the general
duty clause, the section 1926.28(a) general construction safety standard
specifies that the employer may avoid citation by using personal protec-
tive equipment, and thus sets forth a specific duty.59 The Commission in
S&H did not address the procedural regulation which places the burden
of proof on the Secretary in OSHA proceedings.60
The Fourth Circuit in Bristol makes no reference to the S&H decision
and expressly relies on the analysis in National Realty,"1 which the Re-
view Commission rejected. The Fourth Circuit's approach, however, is
better reasoned. In instances of general duty clause violations as in Na-
tional Realty, 2 or of section 1926.28(a) violations as in S&H, s the Secre-
tary must specify the means to reduce the hazard. The courts require
specification because both sections are broadly written.64 Neither section
[1979] 3 EMPL. SAF. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) % 23,480, at 28,432. S&H, published two
months prior to the Fourth Circuit's Bristol decision, upheld a citation for violating the §
1926.28(a) general construction safety standard, see note 16 supra, where the employer
failed to require tied-off safety belts for employees working at a height of 40 feet. The em-
ployer argued unsuccessfully that the § 1926.105(a) construction safety belt standard was
more specific than § 1926.28(a) and that the company had complied with the former stan-
dard. The Commission concluded that § 1926.105(a) was not more specifically applicable to
the facts of S&H than § 1926.28(a). [1979] 3 EMPL. SA. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 23,480, at
28,437.
[1979] 3 EMPL. SAF. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 23,480, at 28,437.
U Id. at 28,439.
56 Id.
7 See id.
:8 Id. at 28,438.
9 d.
60 See text accompanying notes 46 supra & 67 infra.
61 601 F.2d at 723-24.
:2 See note 47 supra.
3 See note 53 supra.
" See 489 F.2d at 1268; [1979] 3 EMPL. SAF. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 1 23,480, at
28,438-39.
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states a particular method of abatement to be utilized. 5 Given this simi-
larity, there is no logical distinction as to the burdens of proof on feasibil-
ity and likely utility of the suggested precautions. By placing the burden
on the government, the Fourth Circuit avoids placing an undue hardship
on employers. Allocation of the burden of proof often can determine the
litigation's outcome." The Bristol holding is also in keeping with the
OSHA procedural regulation which states that the burden of proof shall
rest with the Secretary.
67
The Bristol court's interpretation of section 1926.28(a) to impose a
reasonableness standard not limited to industry custom and practice is
consistent with the position of the Review Commission in S&H. Both de-
cisions emphasize that the failure of industry to deal adequately with a
particular hazard should not excuse an employer's failure to provide a
safe workplace.6 Both the Commission in S&H and the Fourth Circuit in
Bristol expressly declined to limit the reasonableness determination to
industry custom and practice.6 "
The broad standard of interpretation adopted by the Fourth Circuit
and the Review Commission arguably comports with OSHA's Congres-
sional purpose of providing a safe and healthful workplace.70 Neverthe-
less, where industry custom does not provide a standard of care which the
government deems desirable, there are better ways of improving em-
ployee safety than allowing selective enforcement of a general safety stan-
dard. The enactment of specific standards provides a better assurance
that employers will be aware of the conduct required of them.1 In addi-
tion, the use of standard-making procedures insures that the responsibil-
ity for upgrading industry safety is borne equally by all industry mem-
bers.72 By having precise guidelines to follow, employers can develop
safety training programs and work rules designed to meet required stan-
dards.73 Enactment of specific provisions to upgrade industry safety prac-
65 While 29 C.F.R. § 1926.28(a) (1979) states a general requirement that personal pro-
tective equipment be used, the provision does not particularize what equipment must be
used in a given situation. Thus, the S&H decision requires that the Secretary specify the
appropriate form of protective equipment to eliminate the hazard when issuing citations
under § 1926.28(a). See text accompanying note 55 supra.
66 See Note, OSHA: Employer Liability for Employee Violations, 1977 DUKE L.J. 614,
622 n.44.
67 29 C.F.R. § 2200.73(a) (1979) see Bristol Steel & Iron Works, Inc. v. OSHRC, 601
F.2d at 724; B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d at 1372.
68 601 F.2d at 723 (citing Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148 (1st Cir.
1975)); [1979] 3 EMPL. SAP. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 23,480, at 28,436 (also citing Cape &
Vineyard.).
69 601 F.2d at 723 (citing Cape & Vineyard Div. v. OSHRC, 512 F.2d 1148, 1152 (1st
Cir. 1975)); [1979] 3 EMPL. SAP. & HEALTH GUIDE (CCH) 11 23,480, at 28,437 (also citing Cape
& Vineyard.).
70 See note 1 supra.
71 See B&B Insulation, Inc. v. OSHRC, 583 F.2d at 1371-72.
72 Id.
73 See 601 F.2d at 721 n.11 (oue function of specific standards is to provide basis for
adequate employer safety programs).
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tices also insures that the resulting standards benefit from the input of
industry experts and other interested parties.74 Thus, the likelihood of
having well-considered, rational standards on which to base citations
would appear to be considerably greater than in instances where, as in
Bristol, an OSHA compliance officer makes an on-the-spot determination
of the specific measures warranted under general safety standards..
As Bristol indicates, the Secretary has a duty to promulgate and pro-
ceed under specific safety standards where feasible.7 5 If an unsafe practice
is so widespread as to warrant designation as an industry custom, how-
ever, then surely the Secretary can promulgate standards which deal with
that practice. A rule limiting the reasonableness standard to industry cus-
tom and practice could serve as an administrative check to insure that
the Secretary fulfills his responsibility of promulgating and relying on
specific standards wherever feasible.7 6 Under such a rule, if work condi-
tions are observed which the Secretary considers hazardous yet which are
in keeping with industry custom, citations could not be issued until the
Commission promulgates specific standards to cover the activity. Use of
the narrow reasonableness standard of interpretation would by no means
preclude citations based on general safety standards. Where no industry
custom addresses the circumstances of a particular hazardous activity or
where such activity is in violation of an identifiable industry custom, a
general standard citation would be proper, assuming that no other spe-
cific regulation is applicable.
7
The Bristol court recognized that a specific regulation applicable to a
given situation precludes a citation based on a general safety standard.7 8
The Fourth Circuit noted, however, that the Secretary could not antici-
pate and respond to the myriad of conditions to which specific standards
might be addressed.7 9 Thus, the Secretary necessarily must resort to gen-
eral safety standards where no applicable specific regulations exist.80 The
Fourth Circuit held that the Subpart R fall protection standards did not
preclude a citation based on the section 1926.28(a) general safety stan-
dard under the facts of the Bristol case.81 The court's decision was based
on the conclusion that Subpart R, which mandates fall protection mea-
sures for steel erection at heights over twenty-five feet, was not applica-
71 See note 2 supra. Uncertainty as to what specific measures must be taken to comply
with OSHA may well have an economic impact on employers in the construction industry.
The B&B court notes that only the employer who is aware of his OSHA responsibility to
provide expensive safety equipment, for instance, will be able to cover its cost in contract
bids. 583 F.2d at 1367 n.4. If a bid includes costs which an employer erroneously thought
OSHA standards required, the bid may be noncompetitive with those which did not include
this cost, and the employer may lose the job. Id.
75 601 F.2d at 721 n.11.
76 See id.
77 See note 35 supra.
71 See 601 F.2d at 721 n.11.
79 Id.
so Id.
81 Id. at 721.
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ble 2 to the situation at hand since Bristol's employees were working at a
height of sixteen feet.8 3
The Fourth Circuit appears to have been unimpressed by the fact that
the Secretary had reconsidered the effectiveness of the Subpart R fall
protection standards subsequent to their enactment. In 1974, the Secre-
tary amended the steel erection regulations by increasing the height
threshold of the standard which requires the use of temporary flooring."
In promulgating the amendment, the Secretary flatly stated that the
standard continues to provide adequate protection to employees engaged
in steel erection.85 This statement would tend to refute the presumption
that the Secretary simply had no opportunity to consider or enact specific
standards covering the subject of fall protection for steel erectors working
at heights of sixteen feet. In reconsidering and amending the Subpart R
standard, the Secretary made no mention of any requirement that safety
belts be used at lower heights. Given the fact that the Secretary failed to
broaden the requirements of Subpart R when an opportunity was
presented and given the Secretary's statement that existing Subpart regu-
lations adequately protect employee safety,"' the conclusion would appear
appropriate that safety belts were not required of steel erectors at heights
of sixteen feet.
The conclusion that safety belts were not required under the facts of
the Bristol case would also appear to be mandated by the language of the
section 1910.5(c) provision on interpretation of general and specific stan-
dards (interpretation provision).8 7 The critical question again is whether a
particular provision applies to a given set of facts. A particular standard,
where applicable, will prevail over any different general provisions.8 8 On
the other hand, a general standard may be used if specific industry provi-
sions exist but are not applicable to a given situation.8 9 Bristol argued
that because Subpart R specified methods of fall protection for steel erec-
tors, Subpart R controlled the situation at hand and prevented the impo-
sition of liability under any general standard.90 The Fourth Circuit dis-
agreed, reasoning that since Subpart R only specified protective measures
to be taken at heights of twenty-five feet or more, the standard did not
apply to hazardous conditions at lower heights."1
82 Id. at 722.
83 Id. at 719.
84 29 C.F.R. § 1926.750(b)(2)(i) (1979).
85 39 Fed. Reg. 24360, 24361 (1974); see Bristol Steel & iron Works, Inc., [1977-78] Occ.
SAF. & HEALTH DEC. (CCH) % 23,240, at 26,765 (Review Commission decision); Brief for
Appellant at 8, Bristol Steel & Iron Works v. OSHRC, 601 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1979). See also
Builder's Steel Co. v. Marshall, 575 F.2d 663, 666 (8th Cir. 1978).
86 See text accompanying note 85 supra.
87 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
88 29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c)(1) (1979); see note 33 supra.
29 C.F.R. § 1910.5(c)(2) (1979); see note 33 supra.
80 See text accompanying note 33 supra.
91 See text accompanying notes 34-38 supra. The example given by the § 1910.5(c)(2)
provision allowing use of a general standard does not appear to support the Fourth Circuit's
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The Fourth Circuit stated that reading the interpretation provision in
the manner suggested would prevent the Secretary from coping with a
variety of hazards not covered by the specific standards.92 Under the
Bristol decision, however, specific safety provisions for a particular indus-
try will provide little guidance for an employer seeking to ascertain the
scope of his OSHA responsibilities. Given the Fourth Circuit's logic, Bris-
tol might have been cited for failing to provide protective equipment to
employees working at heights of five feet, assuming that a potential fall
from that height could be considered dangerous.9 3
With the possible exception of the Fourth Circuit's allocation of the
burden of proof, the Bristol decision should receive a favorable response
from the Occupational Safety and Health Administration. On the other
hand, Bristol may result in apprehension among employers in the steel
erection business and add fuel to the growing "Stop OSHA" movement.
9
4
There will almost certainly be conflict ahead between the Fourth Circuit
decision that the general construction safety standard governs the facts of the Bristol case.
The example given by § 1910.5(c)(2) points out that the pulp and paper industry, which is
covered by extensive specific regulation, is also subject to a separate general provision on
noise exposure. None of the particular pulp and paper standards, however, deal in any way
with noise exposure. On the other hand, the subject of protective fall equipment, with which
Bristol's general construction standard citation dealt, is specifically addressed by the Sub-
part R steel erection industry fall protection requirements. The Subpart R regulations sim-
ply do not require fall protection for the 16 foot height at which Bristol's employees were
working. The concurring opinion in Bristol reiterates the majority position that because
Subpart R only requires fall protection at heights above 25 feet, no specific standard covers
the facts of the case. 601 F.2d at 724 (Widener, J., concurring); see note 35 supra.
Despite the language of the Bristol opinion however, the example provided by the §
1910.5(c)(1) provision excluding the use of general standards appears more analogous to the
facts of the case. The example notes that a particular standard specifies the personal protec-
tive equipment required for ship repairmen working in designated areas. The illustration
states that this standard may not be modified or superceded by any different general stan-
dard which might otherwise be applicable to ship repairmen engaged in the designated ac-
tivity. Under the facts of Bristol, Subpart R specifies the fall protection to be taken where
an employer is engaged in the designated activity of steel erection. Again, the basic question
is whether employees engaged in steel erection at a height of 16 feet are within the desig-
nated ctivity governed by Subpart R. The answer to this question will determine which
provision on interpretation is controlling.
" 601 F.2d at 722.
" The Fifth Circuit noted in B&B that under the argument made by OSHA personnel,
use of safety belts would seem to be required for an ordinary set of stairs, because people do
fall down stairs on occasion, and are seriously injured. 583 F.2d at 1372. The B&B court
concluded that to state such a proposition is in itself enough to refute the suggestion that
Congress intended its regulations to go so far. Id.
" On November 24, 1978, the Stop OSHA campaign led to revocation of all or part of
some 928 regulations. 43 Fed. Reg. 49726, 49726-67 (1978), 1 HOGAN & HOGAN, supra note 3,
§ 1.01 n.20 (1979 ed. Cum. Supp.). Groups recommending modification of OSHA require-
ments included trade associations, management, and labor unions. 43 Fed. Reg. 49727. The
most frequent criticisms of OSHA provisions charged that the standards contained unneces-
sary detail, that other general standards adequately covered the subject matter, that the
standards addressed concerns apart from employment safety and health, and that the regu-
lations were obsolete or inconsequential. Id. at 49728.
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and the Review Commission on the issue of proving feasibility of the
measures suggested by the Secretary in any citation under the section
1926.28(a) general construction safety standard. Yet Bristol's decision
placing the burden on the Secretary appears to be the better-reasoned
choice and will at least give employers a fighting chance in OSHA litiga-
tion. Bristol's liberal conclusions as to general safety standard applicabil-
ity, however, will do little to encourage the Secretary to promulgate and
rely on specific standards wherever possible.
JEFFREY H. GRAY
C. EEOC Reasonable Cause Determinations Not Subject to
Judicial Review
The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC or Commis-
sion)' enforces the anti-discrimination policy of Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act.2 When an aggrieved employees or Commission member
The EEOC is a five member Commission appointed by the President with the advice
and consent of the Senate. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-4(a) (Cure. Supp. 1979). EEOC Commission-
ers serve five year terms and no more than three Commission members may belong to the
same political party. Id. The President has the power to designate Commission members to
fill the positions of Chariman and Vice-Chairman. Id. The Commission's General Counsel is
appointed in the same manner as Commission members and serves a four-year term. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b) (1976). The General Counsel is responsible for conducting litigation on
behalf of the Commission. Id. The EEOC is empowered under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976) to
prevent unlawful employment practices. See note 2 infra.
2 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (Cum. Supp. 1979). Title VII defines and prohibits
unlawful employment practices, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 to 2000e-3 (1976); see note 4 infra,
and establishes enforcement procedures to insure employer compliance. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5
(1976). Title VII is aplicable to employers having fifteen or more employees, employment
agencies, and labor organizations. See notes 5-7 infra. Title VII also prohibits discrimina-
tory employment practices by the federal government, placing enforcement power in the
Civil Service Commission. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976).
The EEOC enforces Title VII where non-governmental entities are involved. The Com-
mission may seek a temporary restraining order or other form of temporary relief when,
after a preliminary investigation, the Commission determines that such action is nedessary
to effectuate the purposes of Title VII. Id. § 2000e-5(f)(2). The United States district courts
have jurisdiction over employment discrimination actions brought under Title VII. Id. §
2000e-5(f)(3). If the district court finds that the respondent in a Title VII suit has engaged
in an unlawful employment practice, the court may issue an injunction. See, e.g., James v.
Stockham Valves & Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 354 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1034 (1978) (district court should enter broad injunction against employer's segregation of
facilities and programs unless court found clear and convincing evidence that employer
would not continue to discriminate); Groves v. McLucas, 552 F.2d 1079, 1080 (5th Cir. 1977)
(trial judge has great discretion in preliminary injunction order under Title VII); Head v.
Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 878 (6th Cir. 1973) (before issuing injunction,
district court should determine whether challenged system was discriminatory and, if so,
whether discrimination was justified by business necessity). The district court may also or-
der such affirmative action as may be appropriate, including reinstatement or hiring of em-
ployees, payment of back wages, or other equitable relief. See, e.g., Cross v. National Trust
Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1026, 1029-30 (6th Cir. 1977) (reinstatement); Pearson v. Western
Elec. Co., 542 F.2d 1150, 1152 (10th Cir. 1976) (back pay); Jersey Central Power & Light Co.
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alleges an unfair employment practice' against an employer,5 employment
agency,6 or labor organization,7 the Commission must complete a four
step procedure before commencing litigation.8 The Commission must no-
tify the employer of the charge, conduct an investigation, determine
whether there is reasonable cause to believe the charge is valid,9 and at-
v. Local Union 327 of Intern. Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 542 F.2d 8, 10 (3d Cir. 1976) (district
court may order that individuals be granted seniority that would have been theirs had they
not suffered employment discrimination). See generally B. SCHLEI & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW (1976) [hereinfter referred to as SCHLEI & GROSSMAN]; Hunter &
Branch, Equal Employment Opportunities: Administrative Procedures and Judicial Devel-
opments Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Equal Employment Op-
portunity Act of 1972, 18 How. L.J. 543 (1975) [hereinafter referred to as Branch]; Sape &
Hart, Title VII Reconsidered: The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 40 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 824 (1972); Note, In America, What You Do is What You Are: The Equal
Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 22 CATH. UNiv. L. REV. 455 (1973); Note, Sex Dis-
crimination by Private Employers: The Equal Employment Opportunities Act, 14 WASH-
BURN L.J. 557 (1975).
3 Title VII defines "employee" as an individual employed by an employer. The term
employee expressly excludes elected public officials of a state or political subdivision as well
as staff members appointed by such officials. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f) (1976); see note 5 infra
(defining "employer").
4 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2 & 3 (1976) of Title VII define "unlawful employment practices."
Employment practices which discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin are generally unlawful. Id. § 200e-2. See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401
U.S. 424, 429-33 (1971) (race/color); Redmond v. GAF Corp., 574 F.2d 897, 900 (7th Cir.
1978) (religion); Acha v. Beame, 570 F.2d 57, 65 (2d Cir. 1978) (sex); Cariddi v. Kansas City
Chiefs Football Club, Inc., 568 F.2d 87, 88 (8th Cir. 1977) (national origin). See generally
SCHLEi & GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 15-25.
5 Title VII defines "employer" as a person engaged in an industry affecting commerce
who has fifteen or more employees. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b) (1976). "Person" is futher defined
as including one or more individuals, governments, governamental agencies, political subdi-
visions, labor unions, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, mutual
companies, joint-stock companies, trusts, unincorporated organizations, trustees, trustees in
bankruptcy, or recievers. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e(a) (Cum. Supp. 1979).
6 An "employment agency" is defined as any "person who regularly undertakes to pro-
cure employees for an employer or to procure employment for employees. 42 U.S.C. §
2000e(c) (1976).
"Title VII defines "labor organization" as an organization engaged in an industry af-
fecting commerce, including any such group in which employees participate and which deals
with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, hours, and other matters. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(d) (1976).
Id. § 2000e-5(b).
'Section 40 of the EEOC Compliance Manual outlines the process by which the Com-
mission issues determinations of reasonable cause. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1061. Origi-
nally, issuance of a reasonable cause determination meant only that there was sufficient
evidence to settle the case. See SCHLEl & GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 211 n.42 (1979 Supp.).
On July 20, 1977, however, the Commission issued a resoltuion tightening the standard for
such determinations. EEOC COPAPL. MAN. (CCH) 1061. Under the new policy, issuance of a
reasonable cause determination means that the claim of employment discrimiantion has suf-
ficient merit to warrant litigation. Thus, the investigation of claims must meet a more strin-
gent standard and the EEOC investigator must state more precisely and thoroughly the
relationship of applicable law to the existing and obtainable evidence. Id. The Commission
tightened the standard for reasonable cause determinations in order to secure leverage dur-
ing settlement negotiations. The employer now faces a greater likelihood of litigation should
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tempt to eliminate the alleged unlawful practice through conference, con-
ciliation, and persuasion. 0 The EEOC may institute suit only if the ef-
forts to secure an acceptable conciliation agreement prove fruitless." In
Georator Corp. v. EEOC,'2 the Fourth Circuit recently held that the
Commission's preliminary determination of reasonable cause is not re-
viewable by the court. While acknowledging that employers may not have
an opportunity to be heard during the EEOC's reasonable cause determi-
nation, the Fourth Circuit found no violation of due process, noting that
the reasonable cause determination has no legal effect."3
In Georator, an individual who had been denied employment with Ge-
orator Corporation filed a charge with the EEOC alleging that the com-
pany had engaged in discriminatory employment practices. 4 The EEOC
negotations fail. Under the former policy few cases in which reasonable cause was found
were taken to court. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 2, at 211 n.42 (1979 Supp). Thus,
the new policy eliminates the double standard which formerly existed for conciliation and
litigation. Id.
When an EEOC supervisor agrees with the investigator's recommendation that reasona-
ble cause be found, the supervisor sends the investigation file to the EEOC regional attor-
ney. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1 1062. The regional attorney makes an independent review
of the file to see whether the case meets the requirements for a reasonable cause determina-
tion. Id. If the regional attorney agrees that the case is suitable for litigation, the case is
returned to the supervisor, who submits the proposed determination of reasonable cause to
the EEOC district director. Id. V 1063. The director may then send a letter to the parties
stating that a determination of reasonable cause has been made and inviting the parties to
conciliate or otherwise settle the dispute. Id. 1066-76. See text accompanying notes 10-11
infra.
10 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (1976); see EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590,
592 (4th Cir. 1976) (noting the four steps required by Title VII at § 2000e-5(b)).
" 530 F.2d at 592 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (1976)) (Commission may bring civil
suit against respondent if unable to secure acceptable conciliation agreement).
12 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1979).
" Id. at 768. While a reasonable cause determination has no legal effect, see text ac-
companying notes 29, 31-32 infra, the EEOC must find reasonable cause as a prerequisite to
instituting formal conciliation attempts and bringing civil suit against the respondent for
unlawful employment practices.
"4 592 F.2d at 767. Georator denied the discrimination charge filed with the EEOC. The
Commission then issued a subpoena duces tecum, directing Georator to appear before the
Commission and produce certain documents. Id. Georator contested the subpoena and when
the Commission modified and reissued the subpoena, the company filed suit in federal dis-
trict court to have the demand set aside. Georator also filed a motion with the district court
to dismiss the claim of discrimination on the grounds that the charge failed to state a cause
of action and that the EEOC unreasonably delayed processing the charge. In a
memorandum filed with the district court on October 21, 1977 Georator requested judicial
relief after more than three years of EEOC proceedings. See Joint Appendix at 28, Georator
Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Joint Appendix]. The
EEOC moved to dismiss Georator's complaint. Prior to the hearing on the motion to dis-
miss, the Commission determined that reasonable cause existed to believe that the charge of
discrimination was valid. The Commission invited Georator and the charging party to con-
ciliate. 592 F.2d at 767. See note 9 supra. Georator responded by filing a motion with the
district court to hold the Commission in contempt of court. Georator argued that the Com-
mission's determination justified a citation for contempt because the determination was a
subterfuge which attempted to convey the impression that Georator's complaint was moot.
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concluded that there was reasonable cause to believe that the charge was
valid. Georator subsequently filed a complaint in federal district court
seeking review of the Commission's determination. The district court dis-
missed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
15
On appeal to the Fourth Circuit, 6 Georator argued that the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act (APA)1 provides for review of reasonable cause de-
terminations made by the EEOC.'8 Georator further contended that if
review is not provided by the APA, Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
violates the fifth amendment due process clause. 9 The Fourth Circuit re-
jected both contentions.20
The procedures the EEOC must follow in bringing an employment
discrimination suit are set out in Title VII.2 ' Title VII does not provide
for preliminary review of an EEOC finding that reasonable cause exists to
believe that an employment discrimination charge is valid. Nevertheless,
Georator argued that the APA provides for judicial review of final agency
action.22 The APA defines agency action as an "order."" s An "order" con-
See Joint Appendix, supra, at 43. Thus, Georator contended that the EEOC's action sought
to deprive Georator of its day in court and willfully interfered with the orderly progression
of the company's cause. Id. The district court granted the Commission's motion to dismiss
but allowed Georator to file an amended complaint seeking review of the reasonable cause
determination. See 592 F.2d at 767.
1' See 592 F.2d at 767; Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 68-69 (transcript of remarks
of district court judge in granting EEOC's motion to dismiss). The district court noted that
the EEOC is an investigative agency, see note 33 infra, and that an EEOC finding of reason-
able cause carried no determinate consequences which would justify judicial review. See text
accompanying notes 27-29 infra; Joint Appendix, supra note 14, at 68.
16 Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765 (4th Cir. 1979).
17 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 551-706 (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979). Congress enacted the. APA in order
to standardize administrative practice and procedure, to facilitate court review of adminis-
trative action, and to create safeguards against arbitrary encroachment on private rights by
overzealous administrators. See Shaughnessy v. Pedreiro, 349 U.S. 48, 51 (1955) (APA in-
tended to faciliate review of administrative action); Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S.
33, 41, modified on other grounds, 339 U.S. 908 (1950) (APA enacted to standardize admin-
istrative practice and procedure); United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 640 (1950)
(APA intended to create safeguards against encroachment of private rights). The APA al-
lows, with certain exceptions, public access to agency records and proceedings. See 5 U.S.C.
§§ 552a-552b (1976); 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Cum. Supp. 1979). The Act also outlines procedures
for agency rule making, adjudication and hearings, and the exercise of power or authority by
an agency. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 553 (rule making), 558 (exercise of authority) (1976); 5 U.S.C.A.
§§ 554 (adjudication), 556 (hearings) (1977 & Cum. Supp. 1979).
18 592 F.2d at 767.
19 Id.; see U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
20 592 F.2d at 767-69.
21 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e (1974 & Cum. Supp. 1979); see note 2 supra.
22 5 U.S.C. § 704 (1976) (final agency action for which there is no other adequate rem-
edy is reviewable). 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12 (1976) provides a link between the APA and Title
VII, authorizing the Commission to promulgate procedural regulations in conformity with
the APA. See also 29 C.F.R. §§ 1600.735-101 to 1613.710 (1979) (rules and regulations
adopted by EEOC).
2- 5 U.S.C. § 551(13) (1976). Agency action includes "the whole or a part of an agency
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stitutes all or part of a final disposition, which may be affirmative, nega-
tive, injunctive, or declaratory in form.24 Georator contended that the
Commission's reasonable cause determination falls within the APA defi-
nition of order as a declaratory final disposition.
23
Rejecting Georator's argument, the Fourth Circuit relied on a recent
Supreme Court case interpreting the APA provision defining "order." In
ITT Corp. v. Local 134, International Brotherhood of Electric Workers,2 6
the Supreme Court reasoned that by using the term "final disposition" in
defining an order, Congress intended that there be some determinate con-
sequences for the party to the proceeding.27 The Fourth Circuit noted
that courts have typically equated finality with the fixing of obligations or
legal relationships.28 Using the "finality/determinate consequences" test
rule, order, license, sancton, relief, or the equivalent or denial thereof, or failure to act..."
Id. See text accompanying notes 26-27 infra. See also Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v.
F.P.C., 538 F.2d 966, 970-71 (2d Cir. 1976) (F.P.C. order instituting an anticompetitive prac-
tice investigation against electric utility not reviewable "final agency action"); Gifford-Hill
& Co., Inc. v. FTC, 523 F.2d 730, 732-33 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (FTC decision to institute adjudi-
catory proceedings against plaintiff not "agency action" under APA); City of Phila. v. SEC,
434 F. Supp. 281, 286 (E.D. Pa. 1977), appeal dismissed, 434 U.S. 1003 (1978) (SEC agency
action in conducting preliminary investigation into the offer, sale, and resale of city's securi-
ties was sufficiently "final" for judicial review under APA).
24 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (1976). An order includes any licensing actions but does not include
rule making. Id.
28 592 F.2d at 768.
26 ITT Corp. v. Local 134, Int'l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 419 U.S. 428 (1975). In ITT
Corp., the Supreme Court addressed the question whether a National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB) § 10(k) determination regarding an unfair labor practices charge is a review-
able final disposition under the APA. A § 10(k) proceeding is a nonadversary hearing be-
tween labor and management conducted by a hearing officer whose primary interest is in
developing a factual record. This record is used for a determination of the issues by the
NLRB. 29 C.F.R. § 101.34 (1979). After all parties are afforded an opportunity to be heard,
the case is transmitted to the NLRB for decision. Id. The NLRB § 10(k) decision, while not
legally binding, practically determines who will prevail in a subsequent, binding proceeding,
which may result in the issuance of a cease and desist order. 419 U.S. at 444-47. Neverthe-
less, the findings and conclusions in the § 10(k) determination do not have res judicata
effect on the unfair labor practice issue in the subsequent proceeding. Id. at 446. In ITT, the
Supreme Court ruled that the NLRB § 10(k) determination is not reviewable under the
APA. Id. at 447. The Court stated that while, in a tautological sense, the NLRB's § 10(k)
determination is a "final disposition" of that particular proceeding, a "final disposition" for
the purpose of the APA requires some determinate consequences for the party to the pro-
ceeding. 419 U.S. at 443. The Supreme Court noted that the NLRB makes no order to
anyone at the close of a § 10(k) proceeding and that the § 10(k) decision, standing alone,
binds no one. Id. at 443-44. Thus, the ITT Court ruled that the § 10(k) decision did not
meet the requirements necessary to qualify as an APA "final disposition." Id.
27 592 F.2d at 768. See, e.g., Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman Steam-
ship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1948) (final order is one imposing an obligation, denying a
right, or fixing some legal relationship); Ecee, Inc. v. F.P.C., 526 F.2d 1270, 1273 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 867 (1976).
28 592 F.2d at 786. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, 339 U.S. 594 (1950). Mytinger
concerned the power of the Commission of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to
issue probable cause determinations that misbranding of products was dangerous, fraudu-
lent, or misleading. The FDA Commissioner's probable cause determination could be made
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as a guide, the Fourth Circuit found that no such finality exists. with re-
spect to EEOC reasonable cause determinations, which neither fix obliga-
tions nor impose liability on an employer.
2 9
Having determined that an EEOC reasonable cause determination is
not subject to review under the APA, the Fourth Circuit further held that
fifth amendment due process is not violated by the non-reviewability of
the determination." The court again emphasized that EEOC reasonable
cause determinations have no determinate consequences, 1 noting that
Commission proceedings are not binding on an employer and are investi-
gative rather than adjudicative in nature.3 2 Where an agency utilizes only
investigative powers, due process considerations do not attach.3 Georator
without an opportunity for a hearing and could lead to libel suits. The Supreme Court ruled
that the probable cause determination was not reviewable since the determination was with-
out binding legal significance. Id. at 600. See also note 44 infra (subsequent cases citing
Georator).
21 592 F.2d at 768.
:0 The due process clause of the fifth amendment provides that no person shall be de-
prived of life, liberty, or property withhout due process of law. U.S. CONsT. amend. V. The
essence of due process is fair play. See Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530, rehearing denied,
348 U.S. 852 (1954). The due process clause protects individuals against arbitrary exercise of
governmental power and is intended to secure equal protection of the law for all citizens.
See La Porte v. Bitker, 55 F. Supp. 882, 886 (E.D. Wis.), aff'd, 145 F.2d 445 (7th Cir. 1944).
A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful
time and in a reasonable manner. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976). Where
a hearing is not included in the administrative process, however, due process requirements
may be adequately met by the opportunity for a judicial proceeding in which new evidence
may be supplied and full opportunity afforded for an exploration of the basis of a disputed
administrative order. See Jordan v. American Eagle Fire Ins. Co., 169 F.2d 281, 289 (D.C.
Cir. 1948). The holding of a hearing is not a condition precedent to guaranteeing the consti-
tutionality of administrative action. See White v. Herzog, 80 F. Supp. 407, 410 (D.D.C.
1948).
:1 592 F.2d at 768.
32 Id. See, e.g., Francis-Sobel v. University of Maine, 597 F.2d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1979)
(reasonable cause determination is nonbinding and nonfinal; investigative and not adjudica-
tive); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1976) (actions of
EEOC are administrative in nature and do not enforce any rights or impose any
obligations).
3 592 F.2d at 768. The Fourth Circuit applied the distinction between adjudication and
investigation set out by the Supreme Court in Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420 (1960).
Hannah held that government agencies are bound by procedures traditionally associated
with the judicial process when binding determinations are made which directly affect the
legal rights of individuals. Id. at 442. The Court observed, however, that when the govern-
ment's actions are of an investigatory rather than adjudicatory nature, the full range of
judicial procedures need not be used, thus implying that constitutional due process consid-
erations do not apply. Id. See also EEOC v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 511 F.2d 1352, 1361 (6th
Cir. 1975) (citing Hannah in making distinction between adjudicative and "pre-adjudica-
tive" agency activities); Genuine Parts Co. v. FTC, 445 F.2d 1382, 1387 (5th Cir. 1971) (in-
vestigative and adjudicative proceedings are separate and distinct, serving different func-
tions and entitling the parties to different rights under the fifth aendment due process
clause); United States v. Steel, 238 F. Supp. 575, 577 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (due process does not
require granting rights which are normally associated only with adjudicatory proceedings to
persons being investigated).
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argued that because there was no opportunity to be heard in the Com-
missson's reasonable cause determination, a due process violation would
occur when the determination was admitted at a subsequent employment
discrimination trial.3 4 The Fourth Circuit, however, found no detrimental
consequences attributable to the employer's lack of opportunity to be
heard in the EEOC's preliminary determination of reasonable cause.
3 5
The court held that, if admissible, 6 the reasonable cause determination,
like any other piece of evidence, would carry only as much weight as the
trial court determined relevant.3 7 The Georator court reasoned that the
employer would have full opportunity to contest the allegation of discrim-
ination when and if the Commission or affected employee brought suit in
district court.3 '
The Fourth Circuit's holding in Georator may be viewed as an aid to
administrative efficiency. A decision to allow review of the EEOC's pre-
liminary determination of reasonable cause could result in substantial
disruption of the Commission's investigation and enforcement of nondis-
criminatory employment practices." The potential for delay and diver-
34 592 F.2d at 769.
35 Id.
"6 The Fourth Circuit adknowledged that the admissibility of an EEOC reasonable
cuase determination at a subsequent unfair employment practices trial is by no means a
settled question. Id. The court pointed out, however, that a refusal to admit records of
EEOC investigations has been upheld. See, e.g., Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853, 856 (4th
Cir. 1973) (upholding refusal by district court to admit EEOC records; admission is within
discretion of district court). But cf. Bradshaw v. Zoological Soc., 569 F.2d 1066, 1069 (9th
Cir. 1978) (error for district court to hold that EEOC determination of "probable cause" to
be given no weight); Smith v. Universal Servs., Inc., 454 F.2d 154, 157-58 (5th Cir. 1972)
(refusal to admit an EEOC investigative report constitutes reversible error). The Georator
court declined to decide the admissibility issue, however, until presented with an appropri-
ate case. 592 F.2d at 769 n.4.
3 592 F.2d at 769. See EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 593-94 n8
(4th Cir. 1976). In Raymond, the Fourth Circuit observed that EEOC investigative reports
have been admitted as evidence in private litigation under 28 U.S.C. § 1732 (1976) (Business
Records Act). The Raymond court emphasized, however, that even if admissible, the reports
are not binding on the court and are entitled to no more weight than any other testimony.
530 F.2d at 593-94 n.8 (citing Smith v. Universal Servs, Inc., 454 F.2d 154 (5th Cir. 1972)).
38 592 F.2d at 769. See also EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 370 (4th Cir.
1976) (employment discrimination trial is de novo and employer has full opportunity to be
heard); EEOC v. Raymond Metal Prods. Co., 530 F.2d 590, 594 (4th Cir. 1976); note 37
supra. The Fourth Circuit noted that Georator alleged procedural irregularities on the part
of the EEOC. The court made no evaluation of the propriety of Commission methods, but
expressed doubts as to whether such irregularities can bar the charging parties' cause of
action. See Ramirez v. National Distillers and Chem. Corp., 586 F.2d 1315, 1320-21 (9th Cir.
1978) (indicating that procedural error by EEOC could not bar employee's right to pursue
Title VII claim); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408 F.2d 283, 287 (5th Cir. 1969) (EEOC
action or inaction cannot affect rights of aggrieved employee under Title VII). Even if the
EEOC declines to bring action for employment discrimination, the affected employee may
sue in his own right, regardless of the position the EEOC takes, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(1976).
3' See text accompanying note 40 infra.
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sion resulting from such a determination is enormous. 40 Even after the
Commission has issued a determination of reasonable cause, there is no
guarantee that suit will be filed.41 As the Fourth Circuit noted, an em-
ployer has ample opportunity to refute a discrimination charge should
suit be brought. Even if suit is brought, the trial is de novo and the
EEOC has the burden of proving that discriminatory employment prac-
tices occurred.42 The court will not determine whether substantial evi-
dence supports the preadjudication finding of reasonable cause.
4 s
Since the Fourth Circuit's decision, other federal courts have relied on
Georator for the proposition that reasonable cause determinations are not
reviewable.44 Given the reasoning and policy considerations behind the
Fourth Circuit's holding, Georator is likely to gain wide acceptance in
equal employment opportunity litigation.
JEFFREY H. GRAY
40 See EEOC v. Western Elec. Co., 382 F. Supp. 787, 794 (D. Md. 1974); EEOC v. Du-
Pont, 373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del. 1974), affd, 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975). In DuPont,
the district court refused to review the factual basis of an EEOC reasonable cause determi-
nation. The court noted the delay and diversion which would result from a decision allowing
review and reasoned that any benefit to be so derived would be insufficient to outweigh the
adverse consequences. 373 F. Supp. at 1338. The Commission must determine whether rea-
sonable cause exists whenever a complaint charging unfair employment practices is filed.
Yet, even if the Commission makes an affirmative determination, .there is no guarantee that
suit will be filed. See note 41 infra. Regardless of the outcome of the determination, the
Commission would likely be forced to defend the decision in federal district court. If the
Commission found reasonable cause to believe that the charge of discrimination was valid,
the employer would bring suit. Conversely, if the Commission found no reasonable cause,
the employee would institute a challenge. Because the reasonable cause determination is a
prerequisite to the conciliation process and to the filing of suit by the EEOC, see text ac-
companying notes 8-11 supra, any action on the claim would be foreclosed and resolution of
the matter delayed pending resolution of the appeal. The Maryland District Court noted in
EEOC v. Western Elect. Corp. that if reasonable cause determinations were reviewable,
there would be no need for an EEOC. 382 F.2d at 794.
41 See 592 F.2d at 768. Alternatives to filing suit for Title VII violations include concili-
ation, settlement, and voluntary compliance by the employer. Any of these alternatives
would preclude the necessity for bringing an employment discrimination suit. See text ac-
companying notes 10-11 supra.
42 See, e.g., Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); McDonnell Doug-
las Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); Naraine v. Western Elec. Co., 507 F.2d 590, 593
(8th Cir. 1974).
43 592 F.2d at 767. See EEOC v. General Elec. Co., 532 F.2d 359, 370 (4th Cir. 1976)
(EEOC proceedings are not binding on employer and are not reviewable); EEOC v. DuPont,
373 F. Supp. 1321, 1338 (D. Del. 1974), aff'd 516 F.2d 1297 (3d Cir. 1975); note 40 supra.
4 In Francis-Sobel v. University of Maine, 597 F.2d 15 (1st Cir. 1979), the EEOC was
particularly slow in handling plaintiff-employee's charge of discrimination. Eventually, the
Commission issued a determination that there was not reasonable cause to believe the
truthfulness of the plaintiff's allegations. The employee then brought suit charging that the
EEOC's improper handling and disregard of the validity of her complaints gave rise to an
implied right of action under the due process clause of the fifth amendment. The First
Circuit found that the plaintiff's arguments were simply veiled attempts to obtain judicial
review of the correctness of the EEOC's negative reasonable cause determination. Citing
Georator, the First Circuit stated that the court lacked power to redress an adverse Coin-
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